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Renegotiating Scottish Nationalism after 
the 2014 Independence Referendum
On 18 September 2014, Scots were invited to answer the following ques-
tion: “Should Scotland be an independent country?” A majority of  people 
rejected independence by a 55.25% to 44.65% vote. 1 The turnout was 
just under 85% and the victory of  the no camp was larger than had been 
expected regarding previous polls. Though the results meant that the 
307 year old union between England and Scotland was preserved, the 
United Kingdom general election a few months later, on 7 May 2015, 
brought significant gains to the Scottish National Party. The SNP won 
56 seats out of  59 in Scotland, thus outshining the three mainstream 
parties, including the Labour Party which had long been Scotland’s first 
party. This situation begs a number of  questions as to the viability of  the 
links between Scotland and the rest of  the United Kingdom, and—on 
a larger scale—as to the durability of  the current system wherein four 
distinct nations with their own features and identities co-exist inside a 
multi-national overarching entity.
The campaign for the Scottish independence referendum was a sur-
prisingly long one. It started in May 2012 with the launch of  Yes Scot-
land, quickly followed by the launch of  Better Together, and came to an 
end on 18 September 2014. Considering the length of  this campaign, 
the diversity of  media involved and the variety of  arguments put for-
ward by each side, it can be seen as rather striking that the concept of  
national identity should not have been discussed in more length during 
the pre-referendum campaign. Pro-independence supporters especially 
seem to have avoided the usual rhetoric of  nationalist discourse during 
the campaign. In broad terms, this refers to an ideological discourse 
focused on the nature of  the nation and its legitimacy as the main foun-
dation for the state’s sovereignty. As this article argues, Better Together 
campaigners paradoxically seemed more willing to use patriotic argu-
ments than their opponents. It is undeniable though that the question 
  1. Results available on <http://scotlandreferendum.info/>.
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of  identity was only touched upon and never examined as a major issue 
either by political parties or the two umbrella campaign groups. This is 
all the more surprising that the referendum campaign could have pro-
vided an ideal platform to have a debate about the state and future of  
Scottish and British identities. Nonetheless, the SNP’s reluctance to insist 
on the affirmation of  a strong Scottish identity or to emphasize its cul-
tural specificities as part of  its rhetoric and political strategy is not new to 
Scottish politics and might go some way to explaining the predominance 
of  economic issues in the referendum campaign (Duclos, 2014).
Traditionally, Scottish politicians agree that Scottish identity is pri-
marily a political, open and inclusive form of  identity (Camp-Pietrain, 
2014, p. 92). This vision is expressed through the concept of  civic nation-
alism, a concept largely used by Scottish political elites to talk about 
the nation. However, studies have recently highlighted the discrepancy 
between the reality of  Scottish people’s perception of  their national iden-
tity and the vision put forward by political elites (Leith & Soule, 2011). 
Beyond this initial problem also lies a deeper issue, linked to the multi-
plicity of  national identities and nationalisms in the United Kingdom. 
If  we take the term national identity to mean both the set of  multi- 
dimensional features (linguistic, cultural, historical, etc.) usually linked 
to a specific geographical entity—in this case Scotland—and people’s 
inner feelings, individual as well as collective, of  belonging to this par-
ticular territory then it both refers to the exterior and/or abstract signs 
of  Scotland’s existence as a nation and to the subjective agreement of  its 
people to recognize Scotland as a coherent whole and possibly as part 
of  their own identity. Nationalism also faces a plurality of  definitions. 
One possible way to understand nationalism in Scotland or the United 
Kingdom is to see it as the political expression of  Scottish and British 
national identities, through discourse and actions. Nationalism, in that 
particular sense, can be seen as one of  the means by which identities 
are constructed and passed on. This theoretical background raises the 
question of  the possibility for Scottish people to combine multi-layered 
identities and the question of  the compatibility between nationalist dis-
courses in Scotland and Britain outside the antagonistic aims of  the SNP 
(Scottish independence) and British nationalism (status quo).
This article aims at examining the content and limitations of  nation-
alists’ and Unionists’ competing visions of  Scottish national identity in 
the specific light of  their campaign discourse in the months before the 
2014 referendum. It will focus on the particular treatment of  identity 
issues during the campaign and argue that the close analysis of  campaign 
productions actually reveals the existence of  an underlying questioning 
about territorial attachments in Scotland, about Scottish and British 
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nation-building and about political views of  national identities in the 
United Kingdom.
civic nationalism in Scotland
Many studies of  nations and nationalism resort to the dichotomy between 
ethnic and civic nationalism (see Smith, 1991; Ignatieff, 1993). According 
to Jonathan Hearn:
[It] has been common to make a distinction between “ethnic” and “civic” 
forms of  nationalism, the former involving beliefs in biological and cultural 
essentialisms, and the latter involving commitments to ideas of  citizenship 
and the rule of  law. (Cited in Kiely, Bechhofer & McCrone, 2005b.)
Ethnic nationalism puts the emphasis on ethnic or cultural features such as 
one’s language or religion, common descent, a shared history or a shared 
territory for example. The aim of  ethnic nationalism is normally to obtain 
self-governance through the recognition of  the nation’s particular fea-
tures. It is considered as an exclusive type of  nationalism, meaning that 
only people with the right ethnic qualities or descent have a right to claim 
their belonging to the nation. It is opposed to civic nationalism which is 
based on the idea that people can willingly become part of  the nation 
as long as they adhere to its core values and take part in the life of  the 
society. It is a form of  nationalism that has more to do with social ties, the 
existence of  a social contract between the members of  a given society and 
their attachment to the country’s institutions than it has to do with cul-
tural and ethnic elements. This particular type of  nationalism exemplifies 
Ernest Renan’s assertion that the nation is “a daily plebiscite”. 2 The civic 
notion of  the nation suggests that belonging to a nation is first and fore-
most a question of  choice and it is linked with the notions of   democracy, 
citizenship and social justice. A remark about the terminology used in 
this article should be added here. The term cultural is highly ambiguous 
when related to the question of  nationalism as has been shown by Rogers 
Brubaker (1998) for instance. In this article the adjective cultural will 
be used to describe the set of  elements related to our understanding of  
ethnic nationalism (language, tradition or folklore for instance). The two 
concepts of  civic and cultural nationalism should therefore not be con-
flated, even more so as the concept of  cultural nationalism can be defined 
in its own right outside the civic/ethnic dichotomy.
  2. Ernest Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation ?, 1882.
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The division between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism can un- 
doubtedly be questioned. The political theorist Bernard Yack for example 
sees in the civic/ethnic dichotomy a myth, that of  consent versus descent 
(Bechhofer & McCrone, 2015, p. 162) while Rogers Brubaker sees it as 
“a Manichean view that there are two kinds of  nationalism, a good, civic 
kind and a bad, ethnic kind” (1998). Nevertheless it seems to be the basic 
conceptual means to understand the politics of  national identity in Scot-
land today. Indeed, “the Scottish case seems to provide a good instance of  
[…] a civic, residential basis for belonging. […] This is a view which runs 
across the political divide in Scotland, including the Scottish National 
Party” (Kiely, Bechhofer & McCrone, 2005b). As Nathalie Duclos also 
underlines: “La conception de la citoyenneté écossaise par le SNP, fondée avant tout 
sur le principe de la résidence, se veut le reflet de son ancrage dans cette tradition 
civique.” (2014, p. 151)
In the above statements, Scottish nationalism appears as firmly civic. 
On its website, the Scottish government defines Scottish national identity 
as follows:
Scotland’s national and cultural identity is defined by our sense of  place, our 
sense of  history and our sense of  self. It is defined by what it means to be 
Scottish; to live in a modern Scotland in a modern world; to have an affinity 
to Scotland; and to be able to participate in Scottish society. 3
It is interesting to note that this vision of  Scottish national identity does 
not refer to any national figures, national symbols or historical landmarks. 
It rather puts residency and a willingness to share social ties and duties 
with other members of  the Scottish society at the heart of  Scottish national 
identity. Two remarks can be made: first, even though the Scottish National 
Party is rightly to be seen as a nationalist party in the sense that its polit-
ical aim is to gain independence, its project is not expressed through the 
rhetoric of  ethnic and cultural symbolism. This is an important charac-
teristic of  the nationalist discourse in Scotland. Second, the recognition 
and defense of  Scottish identity is not the sole privilege of  the SNP. The 
vision of  the Scottish nation as a coherent whole with innate specificities 
is rather shared among the Scottish political community and there seems 
to be little debate as to the civic aspect of  the Scottish nation.
What follows from this definition is the fact that civic nationalism 
relates to a number of  universal values and in that sense could as well 
be used to express the political creed of  other Western countries such as 
  3. Scottish Government, “National Identity: We Take Pride in a Strong, Fair and Inclusive Na- 
tional Identity”. Available on <www.gov.scot/About/Performance/scotPerforms/outcomes/nat 
Identity>.
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France. 4 Besides, civic nationalism—as usually understood in the Scot-
tish context—seems to deny the multiplicity of  referential elements taken 
into account by people to construct their personal identity. It reduces 
national identity to a set of  ideological values and principles while over-
looking the multidimensional aspect of  Scottish identity by disregarding 
the influence of  cultural attributes over people’s perception of  their na- 
tional identity. The complexity and multiplicity of  feelings of  identity 
in Scotland and the United Kingdom means that Scottish and British 
national identities should not be exclusively represented through the 
prism of  the civic/ethnic dichotomy but as complex territorial identities. 
Indeed, considering the absence of  ethnic and cultural elements to define 
Scottish (or British) national identities in the rhetoric of  civic nation-
alism, it is assumed that the fundamental attribute for an individual to be 
able to claim his Scottishness is the fact that he is a Scottish resident. In 
other words, “the Scottish modernist interpretation put forward is one 
of  Scottishness as a territorial, civic-based form of  identity, whereby an 
individual resident in Scotland can claim to be Scottish” (Leith & Soule, 
2011, p. 4). Civic nationalism directly points at the importance of  terri-
toriality in the construction of  people’s national identity. The nation then 
is a community of  people sharing a particular territory. But civic nation-
alism’s vision of  territoriality is restricted in the sense that it equates it 
to residency and makes it one of  the most, if  not the most, legitimate 
aspects for one to make the conscious choice of  adhering to the nation. 
A different view of  territory in the context of  national identity could 
be underlined, according to which territorial entities help people locate 
themselves not only on a physical level but also on the subjective level of  
their attachment to the abstract attributes of  the nation.
Paradoxically, territorial identities should not be conceived as a purely 
spatial attachment. They rely on a greater number of  referential elements 
such as a particular language, specific traditions or a distinct culture. 
 Territorial identities are thus “territorial” in the sense that they spatialize 
a full set of  abstract elements. By giving a concrete location to non- 
tangible elements territorial identities make it easier for individuals to 
apprehend these referential points. Territorial identities must therefore 
be understood as the individual’s realization that he is attached to a given 
territory because of  its multiple specificities. In social and geographical 
terms, this means that people can develop a sense of  belonging to a given 
  4. However, in several parts of  Europe the mounting influence of  far-rights parties, including 
UKIP in the United Kingdom, actually seems to reveal an increasing criticism towards these values 
and the civic basis of  integration and nation-building in these countries.
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territory that is related to their affection for the territory’s specific features 
as well as for abstract elements they associate with the region.
There is undeniably a wide consensus in Scotland as to the fact that 
Scotland is a nation and that its political creed rests on the ideals of  
democracy, social justice and inclusiveness. The above reflection never-
theless stresses the fact that this apparent consensus does not prevent 
the notion of  civic nationalism from being questioned. This is one of  
the reasons why it is important to contrast the theoretical definition of  
civic nationalism to the actual treatment of  identity issues by political 
leaders and campaign groups during the referendum campaign. To what 
extent did campaign messages comply with the traditional notion of  civic 
nationalism? How did political figures manage to play with the notion in 
order to promote their own vision of  Scotland’s future?
Scottish nationalism and the referendum campaign
If  we look closely at the way identity issues were dealt with during the 
referendum campaign, a few elements can be underlined. First, it is im- 
portant to note that few campaign productions were devoted to the ques-
tion of  Scottish national identity. Indeed, issues such as the economy, the 
health care system or Scotland’s relations to Europe were at the centre 
of  political debates, leaving at the periphery identity related problems. 
But the campaign groups’ and political parties’ campaigns were not lim-
ited to the speeches made by a number of  influential figures (either from 
the political, business or cultural stage) on important meetings. Their 
campaigns also took place on a daily basis, on the streets through can-
vassing and leafletting as well as on the Internet. The study of  campaign 
documents including web infographics, leaflets, campaign ads (posters, 
video clips, etc.) or pictures from campaign meetings 5 show that, even 
though the campaign discourse of  political figures did not make many 
references to Scottish and British national identities, Yes Scotland and 
Better Together campaigns made use of  national symbols. In other words, 
even though national identities were not frequently spoken of  as such, 
they were implicitly mentioned through the use of  these symbols some-
times indicative of  campaign groups’ particular visions of  British and 
Scottish identities. Second, there was a fundamental difference between 
pro- independence supporters who put aside patriotic and nationalistic 
arguments because they wanted voters to focus on concrete elements such 
  5. Available on the Scottish Political Archive website: <www.scottishpoliticalarchive.org.uk/wb/>.
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as the economy rather than on the more emotional issue of  patriotic pride 
and Unionists who emphasized their attachment to Scotland as a nation.
Nicola Sturgeon in one of  her speeches underlined the fact that:
Contrary to what many outside observers might imagine, the debate we are 
having is not about national identity. Scotland, like most modern European 
countries, is a melting pot of  different identities: Scottish, British, Pakistani, 
Irish, Polish and many more besides. (2013)
This idea pertains to the fact that “nationhood or Scottish identity is not 
the motive force for independence” (ibid.). The idea of  Scottish people’s 
sense of  national identity was seen as secondary but not as being problem-
atic, in part because of  the country’s positive vision of  multiculturalism.
Naturally, Yes Scotland supporters appropriated symbols such as the 
national flag or tartan kilts. Pictures of  campaign meetings or independ-
ence rallies show that many people used these symbols as exterior signs 
of  their support for Scottish independence. In the end, Yes Scotland, 
despite the fact that it rejected traditional ethnic and cultural forms of  
nationalism and promoted a multi-cultural vision of  Scottish society, put 
forward such elements, mostly on the Internet. For example, the Yes 
Scotland social networks cover picture by artist Stewart Brenmer repre-
sented a Scottish flag and a girl wearing a tartan scarf  and holding a 
thistle. Their campaign motto “Scotland’s Future in Scotland’s Hands” 
can also be read as an implicit reference to the rights of  nations to self- 
determination which is an important element of  discourse in traditional 
forms of  nationalism promoting self-governance on the basis of  ethnic 
or cultural features. However, the campaign for the Scottish referendum 
did not encourage pro-independence supporters to put aside their civic 
vision of  national identity and rely on more traditional nationalist argu-
ments. SNP leaders as well as other Yes Scotland prominent figures were 
consistent in pushing forward a vision of  Scotland defined as a civic 
nation and promoting a society based on the shared values of  social 
justice and democracy. As Alex Salmond put it in his speech outlaying 
his programme for government:
The real debate is how to create a prosperous country and a just society. 
Our attitude towards the disadvantaged and vulnerable. Our welcome for 
people who want to settle here. Our relationship with Europe and the rest 
of  the world. Our strength as a society to which we all contribute. (Scottish 
Government, 2013)
Didier Revest provides another example that emphasizes the strength 
of  this vision of  Scottish national identity, the vision of  an identity based 
on shared moral values and political principles. Referring to an interview 
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of  Blair Jenkins, the former chief  executive of  Yes Scotland, he states: 
“[He] has even explained that there is a definable set of  ‘Scottish values’ 
which are ‘distinct from values elsewhere in the UK’. To him, impor-
tantly, this difference is the basic reason why Scotland must leave the 
UK.” (Revest, 2014) Yes Scotland did not base its campaign on a debate 
about the nature of  the Scottish nation but put forward its members’ 
long-time belief  in civic nationalism. What this implies is that Scottish 
national identity was defined by Yes Scotland members as a socio- political 
identity, equating Scottishness to a set of  values and a yearning for a 
better and more just society, which is in keeping with the rhetoric of  civic 
nationalism.
A more striking element considering the fact that Yes Scotland was set 
up to lead the campaign in favour of  Scottish independence is the fact 
that its members acknowledged the existence and the strength of  people’s 
feelings of  Britishness. Contrary to Better Together members who, as we 
will see, tended to downplay the importance of  Britishness as a feeling 
of  national identity, Yes Scotland shared a positive outlook on the ques-
tion of  people’s attachment to Britain. Nicola Sturgeon mentioned the 
“social, family and cultural heritage that makes up such a [British] iden-
tity” (2013). According to her it would be “‘perfectly acceptable’ […] 
for someone to think of  themselves as British and yet support Scotland’s 
withdrawal from the UK” (Jack, 2013). The idea that Scottish people can 
feel a certain degree of  British identity was not rejected. This might be 
seen as a simple way to avoid social and political issues, should a no vote 
win at the referendum. Or it could be seen as a way to attract undecided 
voters by asserting the possibility for them to keep a sense of  British iden-
tity in an independent Scotland. Nevertheless, this particular position 
begs the question of  the definition of  Britishness. Is it a mere symbolic 
form of  identity resulting from a long-time shared history?
If  we now look at Unionists’ vision of  Scottish and British identi-
ties we can see that it both shared similarities and differences with pro- 
independence supporters’ vision. Gordon Brown’ speech on the eve of  
the referendum provides an example of  the use of  patriotism in the Better 
Together campaign. The repetition of  the word “proud” eight times by 
the former Prime Minister in his speech highlights his strong affirmation 
of  Scottish admiration (Brown, 2014). Though the passionate tone of  the 
speech was not typical of  the Better Together campaign, other prominent 
unionist figures such as David Cameron and Alistair Darling also used 
the notions of  pride and patriotism in speeches, articles or on TV. For 
instance, the British Prime Minister declared a few days before the vote: 
“Scotland is a proud, strong, successful nation.” (Dearden, 2014) Through 
these elements of  speech, the Better Together campaign acknowledged 
| 159
renegotiating scottish nationalism after the independence referendum
the specificity of  Scotland’s national identity. Moreover it related it to 
cultural elements: pride in the nation’s heroes and famous people such as 
Adam Smith or Keir Hardie, pride in the nation’s history and achieve-
ments or love of  the country’s particular features (Cameron, 2012). As a 
consequence it is possible to say that Better Together leading figures put 
forward a vision of  the Scottish nation different from that defined by Yes 
Scotland. Here, in contrast to the socio-political vision of  Yes Scotland 
members, Scottish national identity is presented as a cultural identity.
The United Kingdom was simultaneously shown as a family of  nations 
(to take up a term repeatedly used by David Cameron in his speeches). 
Using the term “family of  nations” instead of  “nation” alone to describe 
the United Kingdom can be seen both as a way to differentiate British 
and Scottish identities and as a way to highlight the inherent link that 
unites the two. In any case, it connects with the idea of  national identity. 
It is possible to note that Better Together leaders often referred to the 
United Kingdom as “our country,” thus offering a counterpart to Yes 
Scotland’s habit to refer to Scotland as “our nation”. Another important 
aspect of  the Better Together message concerning British and Scottish 
national identity is that they are fully compatible. As Alistair Darling 
explained:
This question of  multiple identities is something Scots have been comfort-
able with for many years. It’s entirely possible to be a patriotic Scot and be 
wholly at ease with being British. That’s been the position for most of  us for 
the last few centuries. In a typically unplanned way, this has become one of  
the UK’s great strengths. There is more than one way of  being British—
whether you feel English, Welsh, Northern Irish or Scottish first, you can be 
British too without contradiction. (2013)
David Cameron also underlined the possibility for Scottish people to 
combine both Scottish and British feelings of  identity, saying that “[you] 
can be proud of  your Scottishness, proud of  Scottish nationhood, proud 
of  what Scotland stands for, proud of  Scottish history but still believe in 
being part of  the United Kingdom” (2014).
Being part of  the United Kingdom is presented in that sense as a con-
scious choice made by people who feel attached to the British state, and 
British identity becomes a sort of  overarching identity superimposed to 
other national identities. Even though Better Together tried to insist on 
its members’ attachment to Scotland, it nevertheless conveyed a message 
designed to reconstruct a positive image of  Britain and British identity. 
This image of  Britishness is based on the idea that it consists in a set 
of  values: “British values. Fairness. Freedom. Justice.” (Dearden, 2014) 
These values belong to a civic vision of  the nation as defined above. As 
160 |
études écossaises 18
for Yes Scotland, Better Together therefore resorted to the discourse of  
civic nationalism, only this time to convey a civic vision of  the British 
nation instead of  the Scottish nation.
Beyond Scottish nationalism: identities in question
The use of  national symbols by both campaign groups indicates that 
the question of  national identity was not erased from the campaign but 
used as a means to implicitly reconstruct their own image of  Scottish and 
British national identities to appeal to the electorate rather than as an 
issue in itself. The discourse of  national identity in the Better Together 
campaign for instance remained highly politicized. Indeed, it could be 
argued that the Better Together campaign took advantage of  the fact 
that the Yes Scotland campaign did not wish to discuss national iden-
tity issues to adopt a patriotic oriented discourse. Looking at occurrences 
of  patriotic statements in the discourse of  Better Together supporters, 
there was undeniably and unsurprisingly a political ambition linked to 
it: appealing to Scottish voters with a strong sense of  national identity 
by showing their similar support for the Scottish nation and rekindling a 
sense of  British identity among all Scottish people. Whether in the end 
this strategy played a part in the no victory is open to question. According 
to the Ipsos-MORI poll released on the day of  the referendum, only 19% 
of  the voters said they were motivated by their feeling of  identity (What 
Scotland Thinks, 2014).
In both campaigns, the question of  national identity was used to some 
extent as a means to discredit the opposite side. Better Together supporters 
accused Yes Scotland of  breaking British “family ties” and Yes Scotland 
insisted on Unionists’ refusal to consider Scotland as a successful nation 
capable of  governing itself. After having studied the treatment of  national 
identity issues by the Yes Scotland and Better Together campaigns, it is 
possible to argue that the debates remained centred on a political vision 
of  Scottish and British national identity. The issue of  British territorial 
identities was either overlooked or given a political overtone to convey 
a message during the campaign, so that a real exploration of  the issues 
raised by the evolution of  the relations between British different nations 
was made impossible. The campaign message of  supporters of  either 
Scottish independence or the Union only briefly highlighted elements 
of  redefinition of  British and Scottish identities. Attempts by the two 
campaign organisations and political parties at convincing the electorate 
either to vote yes or no resulted in no-supporters being more anxious 
to assert their Scottish identity than their British belonging. As for pro- 
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independence supporters, the fact that they intentionally avoided the issue 
of  national identity resulted in the impossibility for national identity issues 
to be placed at the centre of  the political stage.
In order to understand the problems raised by the absence of  a full-
fledged debate about Scottish and British identities or a confrontation 
of  pro-independence and unionist nationalist discourses, the conflicting 
views highlighted before can be rephrased as follows. To Scottish national-
ists, the fact that the United Kingdom is a political entity linking together 
four different nations meant that Scottish independence would not impact 
people’s feeling of  attachment to Britain because all four nations would 
still share the same ties as neighbour states. This vision of  British identity 
implies that, even if  Scotland had become independent, the abstract bond 
between Scotland and the rest of  the United Kingdom, what Benedict 
Anderson famously calls an “imagined community” (1983), could have 
been preserved. At the same time, it also suggests that Scottish national 
identity would not be impaired by the country’s removal from the United 
Kingdom and is independent from Scottish people’s possible attachment 
to the United Kingdom as a whole. To Unionists on the contrary, the 
fact that Scotland is part of  the British state means that the two terri-
torial identities are necessarily linked and that Scotland’s independence 
would sever this link. In spite of  the differences between these competing 
visions, both therefore seem to assert a certain degree of  compatibility 
between people’s feeling of  Scottish identity and British belonging.
Although Unionists did not insist on describing the United Kingdom 
as a nation and British identity as a shared feeling among all British 
people, the fact that they defined it in terms of  principles and values 
reveals their particular take on the issue of  multiple identities in the 
United Kingdom. Their attempt at reconstructing an image of  British 
identity as “a strong, albeit non-ethnic identity, apart from and above 
that of  the component parts” (Keating, 2009, p. 67) is reminiscent of  the 
discourse of  civic nationalism. This vision of  Britishness comes into con-
flict with the nationalist vision of  Scottish identity. According to Michael 
Keating:
[The] effort to promote national identities based on universal values con-
fronts, not a Scottish identity based on exclusion and ethnicity, but a revived 
Scottish national identity based on exactly the same values and with a distinct 
European and global dimension. (2009, p. 69)
In other words, Scottish and British identities necessarily come into a 
conflict if  they are both defined as civic, inclusive identities. Indeed, if  
Scottish identity represents a set of  values and the possibility for people 
to live according to these values in Scotland, the British state cannot have 
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a similar purpose without implying a sense of  hierarchy between British 
and Scottish identities. To Scottish nationalists, Scottish and British iden-
tities cannot play the same role in people’s identity construction so that 
defining them in a similar way necessarily creates a conflicting situation 
where Scottish and British identities become antagonistic. Didier Revest 
puts it differently when he says: “To a Scot who believes that Scotland 
is the bounded community of  solidarity (otherwise known as the sharing 
community) he or she belongs to, the ‘family’ cannot mean the same as 
to someone who sees the UK as playing that role.” (2014) For Unionist 
nationalists there is no inconsistency though considering the fact that their 
unionist project prevails over subnational particularities.
Is the break-up of  Britain inevitable then? During the referendum 
campaign, yes-supporters made it clear that Scotland’s independence 
would not mean the break-up of  the United Kingdom but a redefinition 
of  the relations between its states. On the contrary, Unionists heavily 
relied on the rhetoric of  the break-up of  Britain, forecasting the con-
sequences this would have in Scotland and in the rest of  the United 
Kingdom. Alistair Darling for instance stated: “We do not need to divide 
these islands into separate states in order to assert our Scottish identity” 
in his second televised debate against Alex Salmond, using the words 
“divide” and “separate” conveying a negative connotation to point to the 
need for the United Kingdom to stay united. Even though the results of  
the referendum were a clear no, the assumption that Britishness might 
be under threat or lack popular support in the United Kingdom cannot 
be unilaterally eluded. Nevertheless, beyond the question of  people’s 
actual feeling of  attachment to Scotland and the United Kingdom as 
territorial, political and cultural entities, what is at stake is the political 
expression of  Scottish and British nationalisms. These two conflicting 
views remain at the heart of  the debate about the state and future of  the 
United Kingdom.
Finally, we come to the same conclusion as Didier Revest in his recent 
book on the Scottish independence debate:
No discussion of  the future of  the UK will be final, at least, that is, for the 
foreseeable future, unless the very basis of  what it means and should mean—
in terms of  sharing community—is addressed, regardless of  the objective 
differences between the said nations. Put differently, the debate will be as 
much about [the UK four nations] individually as about them collectively to 
do justice to the fact that many […] still see no contradiction in belonging 
equally to more than just one political sphere. (2014, p. 148)
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conclusion
The 2014 referendum put the question of  the relation between Scotland 
and the rest of  the United Kingdom at the heart of  the political debate, 
in much the same way as the 1997 referendum on devolution had done 
before. The study of  the referendum campaign from the specific angle 
of  identity-related issues advanced above has revealed the complex pic-
ture of  national identities and nationalism in contemporary Scotland. 
The campaign debates have shown the reluctance of  British and Scot-
tish politics to distance themselves from a civic conception of  the British 
and Scottish nation. This is one of  the main reasons why we find that 
yes and no supporters actually defended diverging visions of  British and 
Scottish identities that were, as such, irreconcilable. Nevertheless, both 
campaign groups asserted the possibility for people to express several 
feelings of  belonging at the same time, though they did not give the same 
explanation for these possibly multiple identities. To break the deadlock 
pro-independence supporters’ and Unionists’ conceptions of  British and 
Scottish national identities seem to lead to, there seems to be a necessity 
for both identities to be taken out of  the political context of  the refer-
endum and to be redefined so as to comply with the reality of  people’s 
feelings of  belonging. As recent sociological studies show, for a majority 
of  them this is a dual sense of  belonging to the Scottish nation and the 
British state (see for example Bechhofer & McCrone, 2015). In the end, 
the treatment—but lack of  exploration—of  identity issues during the cam-
paign revealed the need for political actors to encourage multi-layered 
identities by redefining their vision and representation of  Scottish and 
British identities.
One of  the means by which multi-layered identities can truly be en- 
couraged is by redefining Scottish national identity. Whether it is taken as 
an ideological ideal resting on the principles of  civic nationalism or not, 
it takes root and shape in a well-defined territory, that of  Scotland. The 
country, given its clear boundaries, makes it possible for its inhabitants to 
develop a feeling of  belonging to Scotland and the Scottish nation. As a 
consequence, Scottish national identity can be redefined, to some extent 
at least, as a territorial form of  belonging to a particular territory, not in 
terms of  residency but in terms of  subjective attachment to the said ter-
ritory, that is to say as the adherence to a number of  values, discourses, 
principles and cultural elements. Ethnic and cultural attributes do neces-
sarily bear a symbolic quality that can be assimilated by the people living 
in a given territory and developing a sense of  national identity. Scottish 
national identity can therefore be seen at least in part as a territorial iden-
tity choice made by people who become aware of  their attachment to 
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Scotland and what they identify as the founding features of  the nation, 
both in terms of  ideology and cultural attributes. Most importantly, Scot-
tish identity is a multi-dimensional identity and escapes any definition 
that would reduce it to a single monolith.
The question of  Scottish and British national identity is still a heated 
issue in the aftermath to the referendum. While all political figures agreed 
on the fact that the referendum would be a once-in-a-lifetime chance for 
Scottish people to change the way they are governed, the results of  the 
2015 general election and the upcoming referendum on the United King-
dom’s membership to the European Union have already led the media to 
mention the possibility for another referendum on Scottish independence. 
Whether a new referendum takes place in a foreseeable future or not, and 
even if  political figures still see national identities as a subsidiary issue, 
the question of  Scottish and British identities and their relation to one 
another as well as that of  the implications of  people’s feelings of  national 
belonging will probably continue to stir public debate.
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